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The rapid economic development in recent years inspired Chinese firms to entertain global ambitions, and
growing domestic competition as a result of the government’s liberalization policies has rendered
internationalization a necessity. In addition to the State-owned enterprises that already had complex
structures from government-mandated privatization, many large private companies developed complex
organizational structures as well to fulfill the demands of the changing operating environment. Some
reincorporated outside of the country and registered new subsidiaries in China to gain legal and tax
advantages. Some formed joint ventures with foreign firms to learn the most advanced technologies. Some
established branches overseas. These efforts seemed to have paid off. In 2009, 37 companies made it to the
Fortune Global 500 list of the largest companies in the world by revenue compared to 16 in 2005. But along
with the expansion, the more pertinent question for shareholders is whether there has been commensurate
growth in their holdings, specifically, how does the new complex firm structure affect firm value?
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I. Introduction 
The rapid economic development in recent years inspired Chinese firms to 
entertain global ambitions, and growing domestic competition as a result of the 
government’s liberalization policies has rendered internationalization a necessity. In 
addition to the State-owned enterprises that already had complex structures from 
government-mandated privatization, many large private companies developed complex 
organizational structures as well to fulfill the demands of the changing operating 
environment. Some reincorporated outside of the country and registered new 
subsidiaries in China to gain legal and tax advantages. Some formed joint ventures with 
foreign firms to learn the most advanced technologies.  Some established branches 
overseas. These efforts seemed to have paid off. In 2009, 37 companies made it to the 
Fortune Global 500 list of the largest companies in the world by revenue compared to 
16 in 2005. But along with the expansion, the more pertinent question for shareholders 
is whether there has been commensurate growth in their holdings, specifically, how 
does the new complex firm structure affect firm value?  
II. Literature Review 
Past literature suggests two primary channels in which organizational complexity 
may affect a firm’s value: firm efficiency and information asymmetry. Structural 
complexity has been related to decreased productivity, decreased internal 
communication effectiveness, and increased management difficulties, all of which can 
negatively impact firm efficiency. Carrillo and Kopelman (1991) studied regional 
branches of a US financial company. They found that the ones with the least vertical 
complexity were roughly 44% more productive than those with the greatest complexity 
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(Carillo and Kopelman 1991). Wang (2000) proposed information transmission 
efficiency as the most important determinant of organizational efficiency and that 
complex structures hinder transmission efficiency. Meyer and Lu (2004) noted that 
Chinese managers also have to deal with the unique issue of “indefinite boundaries.” In 
the familial structure, the listed entity is often just a subsidiary of the larger group. 
Though legally a separate entity, it is still very much connected in terms of management 
and operations with the rest of the group and in the case of State-owned enterprises, 
with the government as well (Meyer and Lu 2004).  
Aside from these efficiency-based factors on firm value, several papers 
document how complexity may twist public perception of firm information and cause 
undervaluation. Gu and Jiang (2002) showed that complex organizational structures 
increase accounting information complexity, and Plumlee (2003) analyzed how financial 
analysts have trouble assimilating complex information in their valuations.  According to 
Root (1996) the rampant corruption in China can easily take advantage of such complex 
structures, and fear of insider trading and information asymmetry can cause investors to 
undervalue the firm.  
There is a surprising dearth of empirical literature to match the theoretical 
connecting organizational complexity and firm value. Most Chinese studies have 
focused on the effect of shareholder structure (Xu and Zhang 2008, Sun 2009). Only 
one recent paper dealt with organizational complexity and firm value directly. Manconi 
and Massimo (2009) studied a large number of US firms over 1998-2006. Complexity 
was measured by the number of vertical layers in the structure, from the ultimate parent 
company down to the bottom-most subsidiary. This was regressed against Tobin’s Q as 
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a proxy of firm value, taking into account several standard control variables including 
size, cash, cash flow, leverage, dividend payout, and a new one, number of segments. 
They found a significant negative relationship between complexity and firm value; a unit 
increase in Complexity led to a 4% lower Tobin’s Q. They then attributed this to effect 
information asymmetry due to the significant relationships between complexity as 
asymmetry as measured by proxies like analyst forecast error and between complexity-
driven asymmetry and firm value. A one standard deviation increase in complexity-
driven Illiquidity led to a 4% decrease in Tobin’s Q.  
From these past studies, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that a) 
organizational complexity has a negative effect on Chinese firms’ values as well, and b) 
the effect can be attributed to both firm efficiency and information asymmetry. 
III. Data Description  
The Chinese firms included in this study to test the above two hypotheses were 
drawn from those listed on the New York Stock Exchange that have filed SEC annual 
reporting form 20-F or 10-K for the 2007 and 2008 fiscal years. Going back further 
would decrease the number of firms with available data dramatically. While there is a 
much larger number of Chinese firms listed on the domestic exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, many firms are smaller in size and have comparatively simpler 
organizational structures, which may skew the study results. Also there is some debate 
about the quality of accounting information reported in China, especially for State-
owned firms. While a 2004 Chinese study revealed no significant relationship between 
accounting standard and accounting information quality, it did suggest that a stricter 
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legal environment like in the US and greater probability of punishment in case of 
wrongdoing may improve accounting information quality (Liu, Wu and Zhong).  
The firm financial data was gathered from COMPUSTAT and supplemented with 
information from EDGAR of the US Securities and Exchange commission. All 
regressions included standard control variables for firm Size(ln𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠), Cash 
Flow, Cash, Market Leverage, and Dividend Payout. Annual reports from EDGAR were 
used to construct the main variable of interest: Complexity. It was defined as total 
number of related entities divided by vertical span. Total number of related entities was 
calculated as the sum of  
1) number of parent, grandparent firms, and so on above the listed company in 
the organizational structure, including the controlling government entity for State-
owned firms, 
2) number of child, grandchild firms, and so on below the listed company in the 
organizational structure, 
3) number of firms with related transactions held by a company belonging to the 
former two categories but not counted before. 
Vertical span was the measure of complexity used by the Manconi and Massimo (2009). 
It was calculated as the number of levels from the ultimate parent firms to the bottom 
most subsidiaries. The quotient of total number of related entities and vertical span was 
used rather than just vertical span in this study to account for the unique features of the 
Chinese firm structure, where the listed firm often has close relationships with other 
subsidiaries of the parent, sometimes even partial ownership, which would be difficult to 
account for with only vertical span. Although the dollar ratio of net related-party 
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transactions and income would be a more precise proxy for these relationships, firms 
vary in the level of detailed reported for such transactions. For robustness checks, total 
number of related entities and vertical span were be regressed individually first and then 
together against firm value as different proxies of complexity. 
 Complexity was first regressed against firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. It was 
then regressed against proxies for the two main channels through which organizational 
complexity can affect firm value as suggested by past literature, information asymmetry 
and firm efficiency. The former was measured by Analyst Forecast Error, which was 
also used in Manconi and Massimo’s study (2009). It was calculated 
as  𝐸𝑃𝑆 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 , EPS being the annual earnings-per-share, FEPS the median 
analyst forecast of EPS from First Call, and Price the firm’s stock price at the end of the 
calendar year before earnings was announced. Return on Asset (ROA) has been used 
to measure firm efficiency by other studies on Chinese firms like Li, Poppo, and Zhou’s 
study (2008). To control for the effect of variations across industries, the percentage 
difference between firm ROA and industry ROA obtained from Fortune’s annual ranking 
of industries (2009) was used. The proxy for efficiency in this study was calculated as 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑂𝐴 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑂𝐴 . Even if the relationship between 
Complexity and a channel proxy was not significant, the proxy was still examined for 
relationship with firm value. A significant result might indicate that another measure of 
complexity would be more appropriate.  
Throughout the analysis, State-owned firms were regressed separately from non-
State-owned firms. Previous studies have shown that state-ownership itself has a 
significant negative effect on firm value, lowering it by 5% in some estimates (Xu and 
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Zhang 2008). State-owned firms also have more complex organizational structures. The 
Tukey’s test on Graph 1 showed that they have significantly larger average vertical span. 
Among the firms included in this study, for State-owned firms, the median number of 
related entities was 20.5 compared to 13 for others. To avoid this issue of collinearity, 
firms were analyzed separately based on whether they have State-ownership. Table 13 
lists all firms studied. 
IV. Organizational Complexity and Firm Value in Non-State-owned Firms 
 Based on previous research results on the negative effects of complex 
organizational structures on productivity, communication efficiency, management 
effectiveness, and accounting information reporting and processing, I theorized that the 
more complex Chinese firms would be undervalued. This hypothesis was tested by the 
following regression:  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛 + 𝜀. 
The results are shown in Table 3. In the initial analysis of all non-state-owned firms, 
Complexity with 𝛽 of 0.047 was not a significant factor in determining firm value, 
however, there were surprising results after removing the two influential firms, GA-Giant 
Interactive Group Inc, and QXM-Qiao Xing Mobile Communications Company. The 
coefficient for Complexity became larger at 0.291684, and was significant at even the 1% 
level with p-value of 0.0024. In economic terms, a one unit increase in Complexity 
raised Tobin’s Q by 11.88%. This result suggested that complex organizational 
structures may not necessarily mean increased information asymmetry and decreased 
efficiency, or those two might not be significant determinants of firm value, whose 
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negative effects may therefore be masked by possible benefits of complex structures. 
The next section explores these possibilities. 
V. Organizational Complexity, Information Asymmetry, Efficiency, and Firm Value in 
Non-State-owned Firms 
 The regression results in Tables 4-7 of Information Asymmetry and Efficiency 
proxies with Complexity and with firm value seriously question the relevance of these 
two factors in the effect chain. Complexity was not a significant determinant of Analyst 
Forecast Error or ROA Difference even when the influential firms GA and QXM were not 
included. Although its coefficient against Analyst Forecast Error was negative at -0.01, 
the t-statistic was -0.53 and p-value was 0.60. Against ROA Difference, the coefficient 
was 0.71, with t-statistic of 0.72 and p-value of 0.48. Neither of the two channels could 
be significantly related to firm value either, both had p-values greater than 0.25 in 
regressions without GA and QXM. 
VI. Organizational Complexity and Its Effect on State-owned Firms 
 All of the regressions above were conducted on a second sample consisting of 
only State-owned firms. The results, reported in Tables 3-7, are very similar. For State-
owned firms, there was no significant relationship between Complexity and firm value, 
and there were no influential firms. Again, information asymmetry, measured by Analyst 
Forecast Error, and firm efficiency, measured by ROA Difference, could not be linked to 
Complexity or to firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
Overall, Complexity affected firm value significantly only when the firm had no 
State-ownership, but that positive effect could not be attributed to either information 
asymmetry or operational efficiency as suggested by past literature. 
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VII. Robustness Checks  
These unexpected regression results prompted the doubt that the organizational 
structure complexity measure used may not have been the most suitable, therefore, 
robustness checks were done using Vertical Span and Total Related Entities 
independently and then together as alternatives. The results are shown in Tables 8-10. 
Vertical Span was used in the Manconi and Massimo (2009) study of US firms and had 
proved to be significant to firm value, however in the regression against Chinese firm 
data, it remained insignificant in all cases. Total Related Entities was significant, but 
only at the 10% level when regressed by itself and the control variables against non-
State-owned firms and without influential points GA and QXM. When Vertical Span was 
added to this regression, Total Related Entities became very significant with coefficient 
of 0.0635 and p-value of 0.0018. This seemed to suggest that the number of layers in 
the organizational structure played a very marginal role in complexity-related firm value 
determination, especially relative to the actual number of related parties. However, 
neither of these alternative complexity measures or their combination could be 
significantly linked to information asymmetry or operational efficiency either, as shown 
in Tables 11-12. 
VIII. Conclusion  
This empirical study on how Chinese firms’ complex organizational structure may 
affect firm value and the possible channel for possible effects revealed some surprising 
results. Unlike suggested by past theoretical literature and an empirical study on US 
firms, the complexity of Chinese firms actually increase their values, but not through 
information asymmetry or operational efficiency. There are some limitations on this 
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study due to the small number of firms and time span studied, but there are also two 
main contributions. It provided some quantitative insight to the existing theoretical 
literature on organizational structure of Chinese firms that might be useful for managers 
of non-State-owned firms who can independently make decisions related to firm 
structure. While the number of studies on the disadvantages of structural complexity is 
large, there are very few on the ways and extent that complexity can provide significant 
benefits. This study’s results may provide the impetus for expanding research in this 
field as well. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Organizational Complexity Measures 
 
Complexity 
=
Total Related Entities
Vertical Span
 
  
Total 
Related 
Entities 
=
Number of parent, grandparent firms and so on above the listed company in the organizational structure 
including the state owned government entity for State-owned firms + 
Number of child, grandchild firms, and so on below the listed company in the organizational structure + 
Number of firms with related transactions held by a company belonging to the former two categories 
but not counted before 
  
Vertical 
Span 
=Maximum numbers of levels in the organization from the ultimate parent group with no parent above 
down to the bottom most subsidiaries with no more subsidiaries below. Each existing level adds one 
count to the span 
  
Firm Value Effect Channel Proxies 
 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Error as 
proxy for 
information 
asymmetry 
 =
 EPS−FEPS 
Price
 
EPS=reported annual earnings per share 
FEPS=median EPS forecast from First Call 
Price=stock price at end of calendar year before EPS announcement 
  
ROA 
Difference 
as proxy for 
firm 
efficiency 
=
Firm ROA − Industry ROA
Industry ROA
 
 
Firm ROA=
Net Income
Total Assets
 
 
Industry ROA=reported industry figure from Fortune annual ranking 
  
Firm Value Measure 
 
Tobin’s Q 
= 
Market Value of Firm (MV)
Book Equity (BE)
 
Book Equity (BE)=stockholders’ equity + preferred stock-carrying value   
Market Equity  ME =closing price at fiscal year-end ∗ shares outstanding 
Market Value of Firm  MV =total assets − BE+ME 
  
Control Variables 
 
Size ln Total Assets  
  
15 
 
Cash Cash and short term investments
lagged total assets
 
  
Cash Flow Depreciation and amortization + income before extraordinary items 
lagged total assets 
 
  
Dividend 
Payout 
Common Dividends + Preferred dividends
Lagged Total Assets
 
  
Market 
Leverage 
Long-term debt + Short-term debt
long-term debt + short-term debt + market equity 
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Table 1 Variable Statistics 
2008 Data Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
Complexity 5.2742 4.0000 4.5908 0.8000 24.5000 37 
Vertical Span 4.6216 5.0000 1.4014 2.0000 8.0000 37 
Total Related Entities 24.0541 18.0000 21.7727 3.0000 98.0000 37 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.2229 0.0618 0.5480 0.0025 3.1477 35 
Size 7.8344 6.8460 2.1418 5.0463 12.0727 37 
Fiscal End Market Leverage 0.2469 0.1270 0.2694 0.0000 0.9091 37 
Dividend Payout 0.0235 0.0000 0.0417 0.0000 0.2169 37 
Cash 0.3600 0.2956 0.2789 0.0112 1.0308 37 
Cash Flow 0.2648 1.3105 7.7811 -42.2276 15.8114 37 
Tobin's Q  2.4730 1.9920 2.7569 -6.9655 11.9103 37 
Firm Efficiency -0.1382 0.3437 4.5062 -15.6811 9.6399 33 
       
2007 Data Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
Complexity 4.8952 3.5000 5.0516 0.8000 29.6667 37 
Vertical Span 4.7027 5.0000 1.3305 2.0000 8.0000 37 
Total Related Entities 22.0541 16.0000 20.1507 4.0000 89.0000 37 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.0110 0.0049 0.0180 0.0000 0.0840 34 
Size 7.5808 6.7181 2.1184 4.8604 11.8868 37 
Fiscal End Market Leverage 0.0908 0.0243 0.1398 0.0000 0.5483 37 
Dividend Payout 0.0725 0.0000 0.2747 0.0000 1.6623 37 
Cash 1.4627 0.7475 2.7647 0.0146 15.4616 37 
Cash Flow 0.3219 0.2317 0.3980 0.0492 2.4453 37 
Tobin's Q 5.6467 4.0661 4.8038 1.3479 27.4406 37 
Firm Efficiency 0.7030 0.2845 1.1913 -0.8387 4.9485 33 
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Table 2 State-owned and Non-State-owned Firm Statistics 
 
  
 State-owned Firms 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
2007       
Complexity 4.7463 4.0536 2.4679 1.8000 10.1250 14 
Vertical Span 5.3571 5.0000 1.2157 4.0000 8.0000 14 
Total Related Entities 26.0000 20.5000 18.3177 9.0000 81.0000 14 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.0164 0.0098 0.0232 0.0011 0.0840 12 
Firm Performance 0.6994 0.2840 1.4216 -0.8205 4.9485 13 
Tobin's Q 5.9535 3.8011 6.5140 1.9554 27.4406 14 
       
2008       
Complexity 7.1363 5.1667 5.8932 2.1667 24.5000 14 
Vertical Span 5.2857 5.0000 1.1387 4.0000 8.0000 14 
Total Related Entities 36.2857 29.0000 26.6037 11.0000 98.0000 14 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.3942 0.0649 0.8975 0.0067 3.1477 12 
Firm Performance 0.0828 0.4231 4.2885 -10.0632 9.1821 13 
Tobin's Q 2.7417 2.0771 4.1369 -6.9655 11.9103 14 
 Non-State-owned Firms 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
2007       
Complexity 4.9858 3.2500 6.1754 0.8000 29.6667 23 
Vertical Span 4.3043 5.0000 1.2590 2.0000 7.0000 23 
Total Related Entities 19.6957 13.0000 21.2120 4.0000 89.0000 23 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.0080 0.0029 0.0142 0.0000 0.0620 22 
Firm Performance 0.7056 0.4163 1.0472 -0.8387 3.6552 20 
Tobin's Q 5.4599 4.1942 3.5485 1.3479 15.3980 23 
       
2008       
Complexity 4.1407 3.0000 3.2272 0.8000 14.6000 23 
Vertical Span 4.2174 5.0000 1.4128 2.0000 7.0000 23 
Total Related Entities 16.6087 14.0000 14.2948 3.0000 73.0000 23 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.1336 0.0346 0.1924 0.0025 0.7785 23 
Firm Performance -0.2819 0.3253 4.7465 -15.6811 9.6399 20 
Tobin's Q 2.3095 1.9074 1.5002 0.4816 6.2432 23 
18 
 
Table 3 Complexity and Firm Value 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
Complexity and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in the (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater than 1.  
Column (3) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Complexity 0.0470567 
(0.05355) 
0.291684*** 
(0.078911) 
0.411856 
(0.756864) 
Size 1.1930769* 
(0.581153) 
0.9415736 
(0.442769) 
0.9643832 
(1.168529) 
Dividend Payout 0.6307388 
(1.914915) 
8.7229367** 
(3.563647) 
-36.52637 
(114.1683) 
Cash -0.31336 
(0.31056) 
-0.470671 
(0.228279) 
12.805598 
(18.06619) 
Cash Flow 0.9317497 
(2.097784) 
4.5358934** 
(1.883922) 
-22.48069 
(36.92297) 
Market Leverage -8.780412* 
(4.499952) 
-2.900131 
(3.64452) 
-3.277294 
(10.55497) 
 
R2 0.335968 0.686912 0.198805 
RMSE 1.433522 1.026132 5.046215 
N. Obs 23 21 14 
Influential Firm: Cook’s D GA: 19.62   
 QXM: 3.95   
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Table 4 Complexity and Information Asymmetry 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Analyst Forecast Error, a proxy of 
information asymmetry, on Complexity and control variables.  
 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2008
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in Table 2, Column (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater 
than 1. Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) 
Complexity -0.010259 
(0.019316) 
0.0187921 
(0.046764) 
Tobin’s Q -0.019833 
(0.023913) 
0.1106255*** 
(0.020919) 
Size 0.0487665 
(0.137664) 
-0.219576** 
(0.075643) 
Dividend Payout -0.140235 
(0.778157) 
2.1320224 
(7.438926) 
Cash 0.0276088 
(0.051108) 
-2.311743 
(1.273547) 
Cash Flow -0.271136 
(0.434468) 
0.5776657 
(2.330572) 
Market Leverage -0.07632 
(0.901636) 
0.0949597 
(0.917625) 
 
R2 0.196375 0.963953 
RMSE 0.221992 0.282579 
N. Obs 21 12 
 NO GA and QXM  
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Table 5 Information Asymmetry and Firm Value 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
Analyst Forecast Error, a proxy of information asymmetry, and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in Table 2, Column (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater 
than 1. Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) 
Analyst Forecast Error -25.34771 
(22.79509) 
10.781396 
(69.48519) 
Size  0.2384037  
(0.77078) 
0.9007167 
(1.250852) 
Dividend Payout 3.9703293 
(9.900388) 
42.778196 
(80.98086) 
Cash -0.285252 
(0.281523) 
2.8476347 
(12.39195) 
Cash Flow 2.0924591 
(2.310205) 
-31.24216 
(27.74431) 
Market Leverage -0.920725 
(5.337662) 
-12.75911 
(8.634145) 
 
R2 0.585408 0.583874 
RMSE 1.244362 3.302558 
N. Obs 20 12 
 NO GA and QXM  
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Table 6 Complexity and Efficiency 
This table shows the results of the regressions of ROA Difference, a proxy of firm 
efficiency, on Complexity and control variables.  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in Table 2, Column (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater 
than 1. Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) 
Complexity 0.7093471 
(0.98293) 
-0.173762 
(0.50637) 
Tobin’s Q 0.1255789 
(0.689369) 
0.3229108 
(0.198565) 
Size -0.769806 
(3.844916) 
2.136388* 
(0.884692) 
Dividend Payout -0.566707 
(22.09035) 
-64.70576 
(80.4291) 
Cash -0.576665 
(1.643422) 
20.217361 
(13.10295) 
Cash Flow 1.433007 
(13.59504) 
-1.872448 
(27.49543) 
Market Leverage 3.5329642 
(27.52877) 
-5.23794 
(8.66909) 
 
R2 0.010835 0.748489 
RMSE 6.136561 3.334189 
N. Obs 18 13 
 NO GA and QXM  
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Table 7 Efficiency and Firm Value  
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
ROA Difference, a proxy of firm efficiency, and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in Table 2, Column (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater 
than 1. Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) 
ROA Difference 0.236857 
(0.246836) 
-0.455432 
(0.570505) 
Size 0.6910636 
(0.444607) 
2.0068754 
(1.904418) 
Dividend Payout 11.532597*** 
(2.535913) 
-55.86613 
(134.1573) 
Cash -0.34047 
(0.189765) 
25.168694 
(25.06468) 
Cash Flow 3.8811264** 
(1.530304) 
-23.71906 
(41.12632) 
Market Leverage -2.384682 
(3.089073) 
-0.62086 
(10.16781) 
 
R2 0.850611 0.240526 
RMSE 0.681474 5.273094 
N. Obs 17 13 
 NO GA and QXM  
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Table 8 Vertical Span and Firm Value 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
Vertical Span and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in the (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater than 1.  
Column (3) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Vertical Span -0.037053 
(0.258224) 
0.0111639 
(0.247811) 
-2.437957 
(1.667204) 
Size 1.1785252* 
(0.594798) 
1.3576451** 
(0.577359) 
1.0010082 
(1.032304) 
Dividend Payout 0.5317757 
(1.981165) 
7.8512391 
(4.89456) 
-61.44729 
(103.4311) 
Cash -0.297273 
(0.317773) 
-0.409907 
(0.310631) 
35.278309 
(22.30522) 
Cash Flow 0.8507485 
(2.15448) 
3.2155709 
(2.518368) 
-1.934917 
(32.92349) 
Market Leverage -7.424786 
(4.424741) 
-7.286778 
(4.216455) 
3.7089465 
(8.591561) 
 
R2 0.304816 0.407126 0.36032 
RMSE 1.466763 1.397433 4.508978 
N. Obs 23 22 14 
Influential Firm: Cook’s D GA:16.61   
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Table 9 Total Related Entities and Firm Value 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
Total Related Entities and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠2007 +  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in the (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater than 1.  
Column (3) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Related Entities 0.0208915 
(0.014739) 
0.02555699* 
(0.013575) 
-0.01039 
(0.121635) 
Size 1.1666997* 
(0.560787) 
1.3686483** 
(0.518493) 
1.0849876 
(1.205051) 
Dividend Payout 0.851828 
(1.857629) 
9.4102154* 
(4.420666) 
-26.01491 
(114.8501) 
Cash -0.319009 
(0.299636) 
-0.451602 
(0.279469) 
13.495617 
(20.30036) 
Cash Flow 0.882271 
(2.021108) 
3.7128401 
(2.279794) 
-15.04235 
(38.97011) 
Market Leverage -8.967031* 
(4.242192) 
-8.972308** 
(3.853836) 
0.1501742 
(11.06033) 
 
R2 0.381578 0.520475 0.165782 
RMSE 1.383415 1.256768 5.149159 
N. Obs 23 22 14 
Influential Firm: Cook’s D GA: 25.56   
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Table 10 Total Related Entities, Vertical Span, and Firm Value 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q, a proxy of firm value, on 
Total Related Entities, Vertical Span and control variables.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠2007 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛2007
+  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of all firms with no State-ownership in the structure except 
the influential outliers identified in the (1) with Cook’s D Statistic greater than 1.  
Column (3) reflects analysis of all firms with State-ownership in the structure.  
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Related Entities 0.0208394 
(0.015226) 
0.0635425*** 
(0.016236) 
0.0210919 
(0.117027) 
Vertical Span -0.025363 
(0.251598) 
-0.265887 
(0.203579) 
-2.502955 
(1.831783) 
Size 1.1648034* 
(0.579288) 
0.9642746** 
(0.438513) 
0.9552152 
(1.140667) 
Dividend Payout 0.8216197 
(1.940803) 
9.5343533** 
(3.623638) 
-62.56581 
(111.5899) 
Cash -0.317362 
(0.309789) 
-0.446299* 
(0.226257) 
34.404287 
(24.51194) 
Cash Flow 0.9045487 
(2.098354) 
4.3448616** 
(1.850581) 
-4.190074 
(37.6081) 
Market Leverage -8.893403* 
(4.440313) 
-2.260351 
(3.818639) 
2.774462 
10.60834 
 
R2 0.381996 0.716065 0.363764 
RMSE 1.428301 1.014079 4.857123 
N. Obs 23 21 14 
Influential Firm: Cook’s D GA: 21.39   
 QXM: 1.58   
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Table 11 Vertical Span, Total Related Entities, ROA Difference 
This table shows the results of the regressions of ROA Difference, a proxy of firm 
efficiency, on alternative organizational structure complexity measures for non-State-
owned firms and control variables without influential firms GA and QXM.  
 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒2008
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2007
+  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of Vertical Span as the alternative complexity measure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of Total Related Entities as the alternative complexity 
measure. 
Column (3) reflects analysis of both Vertical Span and Total Related Entities as 
alternative complexity measures. 
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Vertical Span 0.1978263 
(1.256673) 
 -0.062404 
(1.306693) 
Total Related Entities  
 
0.2353016 
(0.25264) 
0.2382875 
(0.273514) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
0.349126 
(0.626418) 
-0.022545 
(0.725681) 
-0.024406 
(0.76583) 
Size -0.739228 
(3.980616) 
-0.283156 
(3.827607) 
-0.305075 
(4.060165) 
Dividend Payout 0.7167556 
(23.20267) 
5.1812072 
(22.45251) 
4.9916772 
(23.99451) 
Cash -0.240751 
(1.623314) 
-0.865673 
(1.692029) 
-0.858477 
(1.789684) 
Cash Flow -1.880354 
(13.06568) 
2.4677259 
(13.41504) 
2.4782796 
(14.14063) 
Market Leverage 1.2666883 
(30.45308) 
-1.665914 
(27.55405) 
-1.154567 
(30.95183) 
 
R2 0.064232 0.136792 0.137011 
RMSE 6.286545 6.037859 6.363694 
N. Obs 18 18 18 
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Table 12 Vertical Span, Total Related Entities, Analyst Forecast Error 
This table shows the results of the regressions of Analyst Forecast Error, a proxy of 
information asymmetry, on alternative organizational structure complexity measures for 
non-State-owned firms and control variables without influential firms GA and QXM.  
 
 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2008
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2007
+  𝛾𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2007 𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
Column (1) reflects analysis of Vertical Span as the alternative complexity measure. 
Column (2) reflects analysis of Total Related Entities as the alternative complexity 
measure. 
Column (3) reflects analysis of both Vertical Span and Total Related Entities as 
alternative complexity measures. 
For each variable, 𝛽 and the standard error of 𝛽 in parentheses are reported.  
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
 
 𝛽 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Vertical Span 0.0381413 
(0.04205) 
 0.0425151 
(0.045233) 
Total Related Entities  
 
-0.000411 
(0.003885) 
-0.001445 
(0.004054) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
-0.028788 
(0.020981) 
-0.024547 
(0.024302) 
-0.024817 
(0.024413) 
Size 0.0877043 
(0.13525) 
0.0589547 
(0.141261) 
0.0770347 
(0.143197) 
Dividend Payout 0.0716316 
(0.775912) 
-0.108361 
(0.807475) 
0.0112195 
(0.821037) 
Cash 0.0168154 
(0.049623) 
0.0235778 
(0.051659) 
0.019847 
(0.052049) 
Cash Flow -0.187423 
(0.403568) 
-0.209998 
(0.433055) 
-0.231305 
(0.4356) 
Market Leverage -0.388665 
(0.945318) 
-0.073158 
(0.916781) 
-0.384854 
(0.978809) 
 
R2 0.227807 0.179645 0.235897 
RMSE 0.217608 0.224291 0.225304 
N. Obs 21 21 21 
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Table 13 List of Firms Studied 
Ticker Company Name Industry State-Owned 
CH ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD mining Y 
AOB AMERICAN ORIENTAL BIOENGINEERING INC pharmaceutical N 
ATV ACORN INTERNATIONAL INC household goods N 
CEA CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES CORPORATION LTD airline Y 
CEO CNOOC LTD oil mining Y 
CHA CHINA TELECOM CORP LTD telecom Y 
CHL CHINA MOBILE LTD telecom Y 
CHU CHINA UNICOM (HONG KONG) Ltd telecom Y 
CSR CHINA SECURITY & SURVEILLANCE 
TECHNOLOGY INC 
network and 
communication 
equipment 
N 
EDU NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP INC 
education N 
EJ E-HOUSE (CHINA) HOLDINGS LTD real estate N 
GA GIANT INTERACTIVE GROUP INC entertainment N 
GRO AGRIA CORP food production N 
GSH GUANGSHEN RAILWAY CO LTD railroad Y 
GU GUSHAN ENVIRONMENTAL ENERGY LTD energy N 
HNP HUANENG POWER INTERNATIONAL INC utilities Y 
LDK LDK SOLAR CO LTD energy N 
LFC CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD insurance Y 
LFT LONGTOP FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES LTD computers and office 
equipment 
N 
MR MINDRAY MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL LTD electronic equipment N 
NPD CHINA NEPSTAR CHAIN DRUGSTORE LTD food and drug store N 
PTR PETROCHINA CO LTD oil refining Y 
QXM QIAO XING MOBILE COMMUNICATION CO LTD network and 
communication 
N 
SCR SIMCERE PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP pharmaceuticals N 
SHI SINOPEC SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO LTD chemicals Y 
SNP CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL CORP oil refining Y 
STP SUNTECH POWER HOLDINGS CO LTD energy N 
STV CHINA DIGITAL TV HOLDING CO LTD network and 
communication 
equipment 
N 
TCM TONGJITANG CHINESE MEDICINES CO pharmaceutical N 
TSL TRINA SOLAR LTD energy N 
VIT VANCEINFO TECHNOLOGIES INC computers and office 
equipment 
N 
29 
 
WH WSP HOLDINGS LTD industrial machinery N 
WX WUXI PHARMATECH (CAYMAN) INC electronic equipment N 
XIN XINYUAN REAL ESTATE CO LTD real estate N 
YGE YINGLI GREEN ENERGY HOLDING CO LTD energy N 
YZC YANZHOU COAL MINING CO LTD mining Y 
ZNH CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES CO LTD airline Y 
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Graph 1 Vertical Span Comparison between State-owned and Non-State-owned Firms 
 
Oneway Analysis of 2007 Vertical Span By State Owned 
 
 
 
Means Comparisons 
Comparisons for all pairs using Tukey-Kramer HSD 
q* Alpha 
2.03012 0.05 
 
Abs(Dif)-LSD Y N 
Y -0.95384 0.197343 
N 0.197343 -0.74417 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
 
 
